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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Devonte Carter appeals in these consolidated cases from the judgment
entered upon his conditional guilty plea to delivery of a controlled substance in
Docket No. 43850 and from the order dismissing an Information charging him
with felony witness intimidation in Docket No. 43851. On appeal, Carter argues
the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motions to dismiss the charges
against him on double jeopardy grounds following three mistrials.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Carter sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant on two separate
occasions in July 2014. (R., pp.14-16, 23-25.) On August 1, 2014, officers
executed a search warrant at Carter’s residence. (R., pp.16-19, 25-28.) Three
females (one of whom was a juvenile) and two males, including Carter, were in
the house when officers arrived. (R., pp.16, 25.) During the search, officers
found drug paraphernalia, scales, packaging material, and three separate plastic
bags containing methamphetamine. (R., pp.17-18, 25-27, 35.) One of the bags
of methamphetamine was recovered from the pocket of a pair of size 44
“Dickies” brand men’s shorts that were among a pile of clothes on a chair in
Carter’s bedroom.

(R., pp.18, 27.)

Also on the chair were Carter’s social

security and identification cards. (R., pp.18, 27.)
The state charged Carter, in Docket No. 43580 (the “drug case”), with two
counts of

delivering methamphetamine and one count of possessing

methamphetamine. (#43580 R., pp.98-100, 155-57.) The case proceeded to
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trial, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to any of the charges and, as a
result, the district court declared a mistrial. (#43580 R., pp.127-35, 207.)
While the drug case was pending, the confidential informant who had
purchased the methamphetamine from Carter reported that Carter had
threatened her on several occasions while they were incarcerated together in the
county jail. (#43851 R., p.12-15.) The state charged Carter, in Docket No.
43851, with felony witness intimidation. (#43851 R., pp.40-41.)
Following the mistrial in the drug case, the state moved to join the drug
case and the witness intimidation case.

(#43850 R., pp.208-09; #43851 R.,

pp.45-45.) The district court granted the motion and the cases proceeded to a
joint trial. (#43850 R., pp.213, 257-58; #43851 R., pp.46, 61-62.) Pursuant to
Carter’s motion, however, the district court declared another mistrial after a
prospective juror made a prejudicial statement during voir dire. (#43850 R.,
pp.257-58; #43851 R., pp.61-62.)
A third trial (in the drug case, and the second in the witness intimidation
case) commenced on September 29, 2015. (#43850 R., pp.278-83; #43851 R.,
pp.71-80.) During the state’s case-in-chief, Officer Don Craft testified that, while
assisting in the execution of the search warrant on August 1, 2014, he found a
bag of methamphetamine in the pocket of a pair of size 44 “Dickies” brand men’s
shorts that, along with Carter’s social security and identification cards, were on a
chair in the master bedroom. (Tr., p.104, L.24 – p.106, L.18, p.110, L.24 –
p.114, L.24.) Officer Craft also testified he was wearing a body camera during
the execution of the search warrant. (Tr., p.118, L.17 – p.119, L.3.) The body
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camera footage, which showed Carter coming out of the residence when officers
arrived, was admitted and played for the jury. (Tr., p.117, L.4 – p.121, L.17;
State’s Exhibit 13.)
On cross-examination, defense counsel directed Officer Craft to the body
camera footage that showed Carter “coming up out of the house” on the day the
search warrant was executed, and she asked the officer whether the shorts
Carter was wearing that day “look[ed] really loose on him.” (Tr., p.126, Ls.4-19.)
The officer agreed that they did, and he also agreed the shorts had “some pretty
identifying insignia.”

(Tr., p.126, L.20 – p.127, L.5.)

Defense counsel then

apparently approached the officer with a pair of shorts in her hands and asked,
based on the “insignia” and “logo,” whether the shorts she was holding
“appear[ed] to be the same shorts” Carter was wearing on the day the search
warrant was executed.

(Tr., p.127, Ls.6-16; see also p.134, Ls.14-20

(prosecutor representing that defense counsel, without first showing the
prosecutor, “took [the pair of shorts] from her station … and walked directly up to
Officer Craft and had him take a look at it and examine it”).)

Officer Craft

responded, “I can’t say that they’re the same. They appear to be the same.”
(Tr., p.127, Ls.17-18.) The following exchange then occurred:
Q. [by Defense Counsel:] And can you tell us what size
these shorts are -[Prosecutor]: Objection, Your Honor, to this testimony, in
particular objection on foundation. We didn’t know if they’re the
same shorts at all. This officer certainly can’t testify as to whether
or not they’re the same shorts. And it hasn’t been admitted into
evidence.
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[Defense Counsel]: That is correct, Your Honor. This is all
foundational. We’ll be linking it up later with another witness.
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
Q. [by Defense Counsel]: And what size are these shorts?
A. 38.
Q. Thank you, sir. And, again, the size of the Dickies found
on the chair were?
A. 44.
(Tr., p.127, L.19 – p.128, L.11.) Defense counsel did not ask Officer Craft any
more questions, and the trial was adjourned for the day. (Tr., p.128, L.12 –
p.129, L.17.)
Before the trial resumed the next morning, the prosecutor filed a motion in
limine requesting that, “in lieu of declaring a mistrial,” the court enter an order
“barring the Defense from introducing evidence and/or testimony through
previously non-disclosed witnesses and physical evidence including but not
limited to, male shorts.”

(R., pp.288-93.)

At a hearing on the motion, the

prosecutor explained that defense counsel had failed to disclose before trial the
names of two witnesses, Lori Johnson and Megan Schnall, whom defense
counsel now indicated she intended to call in the defense case-in-chief. (Tr.,
p.130, L.10 – p.133, L.9; see also #43580 R., pp.286-87 and #43581 R., pp.8384 (supplemental witness list filed by defense counsel on second day of trial).)
The prosecutor also represented that, despite her pretrial discovery requests that
she be permitted to examine any tangible items the defense intended to
introduce at trial, defense counsel never disclosed to the state the “pair of male
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shorts” counsel showed to Officer Craft during her cross-examination of him on
the first day of trial. (Tr., p.133, L.10 – p.134, L.20.) Arguing that the lack of any
pretrial notice was unfairly prejudicial, the state asked the court to exclude the
non-disclosed witnesses and physical evidence or, alternatively, to declare a
mistrial. (Tr., p.134, L.6 – p.137, L.20, p.146, L.17 – p.149, L.4.)
In response to the state’s motion, defense counsel did not deny having
not disclosed Ms. Johnson and Ms. Schnall on any witness list before trial. (Tr.,
p.137, L.24 – p.139, L.12.) She also acknowledged she did not disclose her
intent to introduce into evidence the shorts she showed Officer Craft during
cross-examination. (Tr., p.139, L.13 – p.140, L.8, p.141, L.24 – p.142, L.21.)
Defense counsel argued she was not required to alert the state before trial that
she intended to call Ms. Johnson and Ms. Schnall as witnesses because they
were named in the police reports and were therefore “known to the State.” (Tr.,
p.138, L.19, p.139, Ls.7-12, p.145, Ls.2-25, p.151, L.13 – p.153, L.8.)

She

argued she was not required to disclose her intent to introduce the pair of men’s
shorts because Carter was wearing the shorts when he was arrested and, having
“been in property for more that [sic] a year,” they were “part of the evidence that
has been in this case.” (Tr., p.139, L.13 – p.140, L.8, p.141, L.24 – p.144, L.9,
p.151, L.13 – p.152, L.8.)
The district court disagreed with defense counsel’s rationale.

After

hearing lengthy arguments from both parties, the court concluded defense
counsel violated Idaho Criminal Rule 16 by not honoring the state’s requests for
pretrial disclosure of the witnesses and physical evidence the defense intended
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to present at trial.

(Tr., p.153, L.9 – p.154, L.14.)

The court considered

excluding the non-disclosed witnesses and evidence in lieu of declaring a mistrial
but ultimately determined exclusion was not an appropriate remedy for defense
counsel’s discovery violations because it would deprive Carter of his rights to
present evidence and to a fair trial. (Tr., p.153, Ls.10-13, p.155, Ls.7-19, p.156,
Ls.1-8.) Permitting Carter to present the non-disclosed witnesses and evidence
was also not a viable option because the non-disclosure prejudiced the state’s
ability to investigate and prepare for cross-examination. (Tr., p.153, Ls.13-15,
p.155, Ls.19-25.) Having considered and weighed the alternatives, the court
concluded a mistrial was necessary to protect both parties’ interest in a fair trial.
(Tr., p.156, Ls.9-18.) The court therefore declared a mistrial and discharged the
jury. (Tr., p.156, L.21 – p.158, L.13.)
After the court declared the third mistrial, Carter filed motions to dismiss
the charges in both cases on double jeopardy grounds. (#43850 R., pp.305-19;
#43851 R., pp.96-110.) As the bases for his motions, Carter argued there was
no discovery violation; even if there was a discovery violation, a sanction short of
a mistrial would have been appropriate; and the mistrial was not justified by
manifest necessity. (#43850 R., pp.305-19; #43851 R., pp.96-110.) The district
court denied the motions, finding Carter did fail to disclose witnesses and
evidence and, in light of that failure, a mistrial was manifestly necessary to
protect both parties’ right to a fair trial; as such, the continued prosecution of
Carter was not barred by double jeopardy.
#43850 R., pp.340-41; #43851 R., pp.117-18.)
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(Tr., p.159, L.20 – p.163, L.18;

After the court denied Carter’s motions to dismiss, Carter and the state
entered into a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, pursuant to which Carter pled
guilty to one count of delivering methamphetamine in the drug case and to
misdemeanor assault in an unrelated case; the witness intimidation case, as well
as the remaining charges in the drug case, were dismissed; the parties stipulated
to the imposition of a unified sentence of 12 years, with four years fixed; and
Carter reserved the right to appeal the district court’s ruling denying his motions
to dismiss the drug case and witness intimidation case on double jeopardy
grounds. (Tr., p.164, L.10 – p.165, L.9, p.168, Ls.1-3; #43850 R., pp.322-23,
326-33.)

The district court accepted Carter’s conditional plea, imposed the

stipulated sentence in the drug case, and entered an order dismissing the
witness intimidation case. (Tr., p.166, L.7 – p.173, L.24; #43850 R., pp.334-39;
#43851 R., pp.115-16.) Carter timely appealed both from the judgment in the
drug case and from the order of dismissal in the witness intimidation case.
(#43850 R., pp.342-45; #43851 R., pp.119-22.)
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ISSUE
Carter states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Carter’s motion
to dismiss?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Carter failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motions to dismiss the prosecutions against him on double jeopardy
grounds following three mistrials, the first of which was the result of a hung jury,
the second of which Carter himself requested, and the third of which was justified
by manifest necessity based on Carter’s failure to disclose to the state before
trial witnesses and physical evidence that were material to the defense he
ultimately attempted to present?
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ARGUMENT
Carter Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying
His Motions To Dismiss On Double Jeopardy Grounds
A.

Introduction
Carter argues the district court erred by denying his motions to dismiss the

charges in both the drug case and the witness intimidation case on double
jeopardy grounds.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.8-15.)

Specifically, he argues the

district court abused its discretion by declaring a mistrial as a sanction for
defense counsel’s discovery violations and, as such, the mistrial was not justified
by the showing of manifest necessity required to overcome the double jeopardy
bar to successive prosecutions. (Id.) Carter’s argument fails.

A review of the

record and of the applicable law shows Carter has failed to demonstrate either
that the district court abused its discretion or that his double jeopardy rights were
violated.
B.

Standard Of Review
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. E.g., State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184-85, 45 P.3d 838, 840-41
(2002); State v. Dixon, 140 Idaho 301, 304, 92 P.3d 551, 554 (Ct. App. 2004);
State v. Keetch, 134 Idaho 327, 329, 1 P.3d 828, 830 (Ct. App. 2000). Where,
as here, the motion was premised on a claim that double jeopardy bars further
prosecution following a mistrial declared without the defendant’s consent, the
question on appeal is whether the mistrial was declared due to “manifest
necessity.”

State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 344-46, 127 P.3d 954, 960-62
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(2005).

“[T]he decision whether to declare a mistrial and whether there is

manifest necessity is within the district court’s discretion.” Id. at 345, 127 P.3d at
961 (citing State v. Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 976 P.2d 462 (1999); State v.
Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 826, 892 P.2d 889, 893 (1995)).
C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Concluding A Mistrial
Was Manifestly Necessary Due To Defense Counsel’s Failure To Disclose
Witnesses And Evidence And, As Such, The Continued Prosecution Of
Carter Following The Mistrial Was Not Barred By Double Jeopardy
The double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions prohibit

the government from twice putting any person in jeopardy for the same crime.
See Idaho Const. art. I, § 13; U.S. Const. amend. V; State v. Manley, 142 Idaho
338, 343, 127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005). “This protection applies not only to multiple
punishments, but also to multiple prosecutions for the same crimes.” Manley,
142 Idaho at 343, 127 P.3d at 959 (citing State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 778,
979 P.2d 648, 651 (1999); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993)).
“While the double jeopardy clause protects against repeated convictions
and prosecutions for the same crime, it does not mean that a criminal defendant
is entitled to go free every time a trial fails to end in a final judgment.” Manley,
142 Idaho at 344, 127 P.3d at 960 (citing Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688
(1949)).

Even where the defendant has not consented to the premature

termination of a trial, double jeopardy prohibitions will not bar a retrial as long as
the mistrial was the result of “manifest necessity.” Id. (citing United States v.
Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824)).

The Idaho Supreme Court, quoting an ALR

annotation, has described this “manifest necessity” standard as follows:
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The basic rule is that criminal actions may be terminated by a
mistrial without double jeopardy consequences if there is a sufficiently
compelling reason to do so, some procedural error or other problem
obstructing a full and fair adjudication of the case which is serious
enough to outweigh the interest of the defendant in obtaining a final
resolution of the charges against him—what is commonly termed a
“manifest necessity” or “legal necessity.” The courts have generally
declined to lay out any bright-line rule as to what constitutes “manifest
necessity,” but have based their decisions on the facts of each case,
looking to such factors as whether the problem could be adequately
resolved by any less drastic alternative action; whether it would
necessarily have led to a reversal on appeal if the trial had continued
and the defendant had been convicted; whether it reflected bad faith
or oppressive conduct on the part of the prosecution; whether or not it
had been declared in the interest of the defendant; and whether and to
what extent the defendant would be prejudiced by a second trial.
Since the trial judge is ordinarily in the best position to observe the
circumstances which allegedly call for a mistrial, his or her judgment
as to the necessity for a mistrial is commonly deferred to; but that
judgment may be set aside if the reviewing court finds that the judge
has abused this discretionary power, particularly where it appears that
the judge has not “scrupulously” exercised his or her discretion by
making a full inquiry into all the pertinent circumstances and
deliberately considering the options available....
State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 826, 892 P.2d 889, 893 (1995) (citations and
emphasis omitted), quoted in Manley, 142 Idaho at 344, 127 P.3d at 960; see
also State v. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, ___, 377 P.3d 1082, 1092 (Ct. App. 2016)
(trial court declaring mistrial over defendant’s objection must “scrupulously
exercise[] his or her discretion by making a full inquiry into all the pertinent
circumstances and deliberately considering the options available”) (citation
omitted).
In this case, the district court declared a mistrial after concluding defense
counsel violated the rules of discovery by failing to honor the state’s request for
pretrial disclosure of the witnesses and physical evidence she intended to
introduce at trial. (Tr., p.153, L.9 – p.156, L.18.) The court did not reach its
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decision lightly. To the contrary, the court inquired into both the nature and
purpose of the non-disclosed witnesses and evidence and the reasons for the
non-disclosure, heard extensive argument from both the prosecutor and defense
counsel regarding potential prejudice or lack thereof the state would suffer if
Carter were permitted to introduce the witnesses and evidence despite the nondisclosure, and deliberately considered the options presented to it. (Tr., p.130,
L.7 – p.156, L.18.) The court specifically considered excluding the non-disclosed
evidence but determined, in light of defense counsel’s representations that the
evidence was important to the defense’s case, that exclusion was not an
appropriate remedy because it would deprive Carter of his right to present
evidence and, ultimately, would likely result in a post-conviction action on which
Carter would probably have “a very good chance of success.” (Tr., p.153, L.9 –
p.155, L.19, p.156, Ls.1-8.) The court was equally cognizant of the state’s right
to a fair trial, however, and found with respect to the undisclosed witnesses that,
“[w]hile the ‘State knew of these witnesses, that doesn’t mean the State actively
went out and investigated and did what they could to determine the credibility of
the witnesses, ways to attack the credibility. And the State in my mind just would
not be prepared – probably would not be prepared for cross-examination.” (Tr.,
p.153, L.10 – p.154, L.14, p.155, Ls.19-25.) Having carefully considered the
circumstances and the options available to it, the district court “reluctantly”
declared a mistrial to protect “both sides’ interest in a fair trial.” (Tr., p.156, Ls.918.)
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At the hearing on Carter’s subsequent motion to dismiss, the district court
correctly recognized that the issue before it was whether the mistrial “was proper
based upon the principle of manifest necessity.” (Tr., p.159, L.20 – p.160, L.1.)
The court quoted the Idaho Supreme Court’s recitation of the factors relevant to
a “manifest necessity” determination, including “whether the problem could be
adequately resolved by any less drastic alternative action”; “whether it would
necessarily have led to a reversal on appeal if the trial had continued and the
defendant had been convicted”; “whether or not [the mistrial] had been declared
in the interest of the defendant”; and “whether and to what extent the defendant
would be prejudiced by a [s]econd trial.” (Tr., p.160, L.4 – p.161, L.16 (citing
Manley, supra).) The court then reiterated its reasons for having declared a
mistrial, noting it had done so in “an effort to protect the rights of the defendant”
after his trial counsel failed to disclose witnesses and evidence. (Tr., p.161,
Ls.18-24.) The court explained it “certainly could have excluded the evidence
and continued with the trial,” but it “elected not to do that because it occurred to
[the court] that the evidence that the defense sought to use was important
evidence that Mr. Carter wanted to be able to present in an effort to obtain an
acquittal.” (Tr., p.161, L.24 – p.162, L.4.) One “very important factor” in the
court’s decision to declare a mistrial rather than excluding the evidence and
proceeding with the trial was its belief that, had Carter been convicted, he would
have had a “good chance” obtaining post-conviction relief. (Tr., p.162, Ls.5-17.)
Finally, the court found that Carter would not be prejudiced by another trial –
“[j]ust the opposite, he would not be prejudiced because he would have been
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able to use some of this evidence that would have otherwise been excluded.”
(Tr., p.162, L.18 – p.163, L.9.)
The record shows the district court applied the correct legal standards,
considered all of the circumstances, and scrupulously exercised its discretion in
declaring a mistrial based on defense counsel’s failure to honor the state’s
pretrial requests for discovery of witnesses and physical evidence the defense
intended to present at trial. The court declared the mistrial only after finding it
was necessary to protect both parties’ interest in a fair trial and, more
specifically, to protect Carter’s right to have the case decided on all of the
evidence available to him. Because the trial court was in the best position to
make that determination, and because the record supports the court’s ultimate
finding that a mistrial was manifestly necessary to ensure the fairness of the
proceedings, the court’s exercise of discretion in declaring the mistrial should not
be disturbed. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971) (the “doctrine
of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to” declare a
mistrial without the defendant’s consent “until a scrupulous exercise of judicial
discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be
served by a continuation of the proceedings”); Manley, 142 Idaho at 344, 127
P.3d at 960 (quoting Stevens, 126 Idaho at 826, 892 P.2d at 893, and annotation
quoted therein) (“Since the trial judge is ordinarily in the best position to observe
the circumstances which allegedly call for a mistrial, his or her judgment as to the
necessity for a mistrial is commonly deferred to.”).

14

On appeal, Carter does not challenge the trial court’s finding that defense
counsel violated her discovery obligations by not honoring the state’s pretrial
requests for disclosure of the witnesses and evidence the defense intended to
introduce at trial. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.8-15.) Instead, he challenges the
district court’s decision to declare a mistrial as a “sanction” for the discovery
violations, arguing the district court abused its discretion in “two ways”: (1) by
“fail[ing] to consider alternative remedies for the discovery violation”; and (2) by
“not provid[ing] Mr. Carter with an adequate opportunity to be heard on the
remedy.” (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) A review of the record and of the applicable
law shows Carter has failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion.
As set forth in more detail above, in deciding how to best address defense
counsel’s failure to disclose certain witnesses and evidence, the district court
expressly considered the two options with which it had been presented - i.e., to
either exclude the evidence or declare a mistrial. Carter complains on appeal
that the court did not consider other potential remedies, such as “a brief recess
or continuance … in order for the State to investigate the two witnesses and
obtain impeachment material.” (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) The state agrees the
court did not explicitly articulate its consideration of a continuance as an
alternative to a mistrial, but nothing in the law required it to do so. As explained
in State v. Nab, 113 Idaho 168, 742 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1987):
The cases establish that it is the court’s duty to obtain sufficient
information to enable it to consider alternatives to a mistrial. The
constitution does not require the trial judge to state explicitly on the
record the reasons leading to a finding of manifest necessity, but
the record must support explicit or implicit findings of manifest
necessity.

15

113 Idaho at 171, 742 P.2d at 426 (internal citations omitted).
Here, although the court did not explicitly consider a continuance as a
potential alternative to a mistrial, such does not mean that it did not actually
contemplate the possibility and, in fact, the record shows that it likely did. In
making her case for exclusion of the non-disclosed evidence or, alternatively, a
mistrial, the prosecutor twice noted she was prejudiced by the timing of defense
counsel’s attempts to introduce the evidence because it was the second day of
what was scheduled to be only a four-day trial. (Tr., p.134, L.6 – p.135, L.14.)
The prosecutor argued she did not have time either to investigate how defense
counsel obtained the pair of shorts she showed to Officer Craft (and whether
they were in fact the same shorts Carter was wearing when the search warrant
was executed), and would not have enough time before the trial was set to
conclude to investigate and prepare for the cross-examination of the newly
disclosed witnesses whom, the prosecutor explained, had the “potential to
change the State’s theory of the case.”

(Id.)

In light of the prosecutor’s

argument, and the court’s express determination that a mistrial was necessary to
protect both parties’ interest in a fair trial, it is a fair inference that the court
considered the option of a continuance but rejected it because, in the timeframe
the court and parties had for trial, the state “probably would not be prepared for
cross-examination.”
Even if the court did not consider the option of a continuance, such was
not an abuse of discretion.

Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1 governs motions for

mistrials in criminal cases and provides, in relevant part, that “[a] mistrial be
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declared upon motion of the state, when there occurs during the trial …
misconduct by the defendant, [or] the defendant’s attorney … resulting in
substantial prejudice to the state’s case.” I.C.R. 29.1(b); see also Brackett, 160
Idaho at ___, 377 P.3d at 1091. It is undisputed on appeal that Carter’s trial
counsel violated her discovery obligations by failing to disclose witnesses and
evidence she intended to introduce at trial. Given the circumstances, and having
also considered Carter’s interest in having his case presented on the merits
despite his counsel’s misconduct, the court acted well within its discretion and
within its authority under I.C.R. 29.1(b) in concluding a mistrial was manifestly
necessary because the nondisclosure, after the case had already been fully tried
to a jury once before, was inexcusable and substantially prejudiced the state’s
case.
In addition to complaining that the court did not expressly consider a
continuance, Carter argues “the tangible evidence of the size 38 shorts could
have been excluded, and a curative instruction given. But the district court did
not consider these options.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

Carter’s argument is

clearly belied by the record. (Tr., p.155, L.6 – p.156, L.8 (court considering but
rejecting exclusion of evidence as a viable remedy in light of Carter’s interest in a
fair trial and right to present evidence).) Moreover, that is not even the remedy
defense counsel requested.

When confronted with the state’s motion for

exclusion or, alternatively, a mistrial, trial counsel was adamant that the size 38
shorts should not be excluded, claiming both that there was no discovery
violation and that the shorts were relevant to rebut the state’s claim that the size
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44 “Dickies” brand shorts from which the methamphetamine was seized
belonged to her client. (Tr., p.139, L.13 – p.140, L.8, p.141, L.20 – p.145, L.25.)
That the district court did not disregard counsel’s wishes that the shorts not be
excluded does not establish the court abused its discretion.

As Carter’s

appellate counsel correctly observes, exclusion of evidence is the most drastic
sanction a court can impose for a discovery violation. (See Appellant’s brief,
p.11 (citing State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 264, 233 P.3d 190, 195 (Ct. App.
2010).) In deliberately considering the option of exclusion but choosing instead
to respect Carter’s right to present relevant evidence, the court scrupulously
exercised the discretion afforded it to declare a mistrial when such was
necessary to serve the ends of justice. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485.
In a final argument, Carter complains the trial court did not give him an
adequate opportunity to be heard regarding the appropriate remedy for defense
counsel’s discovery violations. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14.) In support of his
claim, Carter quotes Stevens, 126 Idaho at 827, 892 P.2d at 894, for the
proposition that a “defendant has a ‘significant interest in the decision whether or
not to take the case from the jury when circumstances occur which might be
thought to warrant a declaration of a mistrial.’” (Appellant’s brief, p.13.) Stevens,
however, is easily distinguishable.
In Stevens, the trial court declared a mistrial without Stevens’ consent, and
without giving Stevens any opportunity to be heard, after perceiving that the state
engaged in misconduct that prejudiced Stevens’ right to a fair trial. Stevens, 126
Idaho at 823-24, 892 P.2d at 890-91. The Idaho Supreme Court held this was
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error, reasoning that by “not giv[ing] counsel a meaningful opportunity to be
heard on the issue of whether the perceived judicial misconduct of the
prosecuting attorney was ‘serious enough to outweigh the interest of the
defendant in obtaining a final resolution of the charges against him,” the trial
court “breached his duty by failing to obtain sufficient information to enable him
to consider available alternatives to a mistrial.”
(emphasis in original).

Id. at 827, 892 P.2d at 894

In this case, it was defense counsel’s misconduct

(violation of the discovery rules) that precipitated the mistrial motion. Although
Carter was certainly entitled to be heard regarding the appropriate remedy for
that misconduct, the district court gave Carter’s counsel ample opportunity to
respond to the state’s motion and, in response, counsel repeatedly argued
against exclusion of the nondisclosed witnesses and evidence. (Tr., p.137, L.24
– p.145, L.25, p.149, L.16 – p.153, L.8.) Because it was the state’s interest in a
fair trial at stake as a result of defense counsel’s misconduct, and because the
court gave defense counsel an opportunity to be heard regarding the appropriate
remedy, the court did not abuse its discretion by balancing the parties’ respective
interests in a way that ultimately honored both parties’ right to a fair trial.
Carter has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion in granting the state’s motion for a mistrial. He has therefore also
failed to demonstrate that his continued prosecution following the mistrial
constituted a violation of his constitutional double jeopardy rights. This Court
should therefore affirm his conviction and the district court’s orders denying his
motions to dismiss.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment in Docket
No. 43850 and the district court’s orders denying Carter’s motions to dismiss in
Docket Nos. 43850 and 43851.
DATED this 5th day of October, 2016.
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